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a b s t r a c t
We present a foundational framework, which we call D, unifying a lazy programming
language with an impredicative constructive set theory IZFR by means of dependent
types. We show that unification brings many benefits to both worlds. First, D supports
two paramount paradigms of creating reliable software: correctness by construction
and post-construction verification, while retaining the expressiveness of set theory.
Second, D provides new expressive power, which makes it possible to internalize and
prove inside D the standard meta-theoretic properties of constructive systems, such as
Numerical Existence Property and Program Extraction. Finally, computation arising from
the programming language significantly enriches set theory, as we show that D is stronger
than IZFR and that its real numbers behave in a better way.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consider a simple recursive program:
f(0) = 0
f(n+1) = f(n) + 1
It is straightforward to prove that ∀n ∈ ω. f (n) = n. Just proceed by induction on n, and the claim follows.
But is it really that simple? Just where exactly does this argument take place, and how easy is it to fully formalize it? Two
major answers are:
1. The argument is done where all mathematical developments are done: in set theory. Numbers are formalized in the
standard way and recursion is defined using the Recursion Theorem. The syntax of the programming language can be
formalized using for example Gödel numbering or hereditarily finite sets, and there are plenty of semantics to choose
from.
2. The argument is done in a logic designed from the start to reason about programs, embedding programs and computation
deeply inside, with an existing computer tool which can be used for formalization. Prominent examples of such logics
are Higher Order Logic [11], versions of type theory [8,29] and MinLog [4].
These answers are not really satisfactory. The formalization of arguments in set theory, although a standard procedure
from the mathematical point of view, is very difficult to apply in practice. The sheer amount of formalizations needed to
prove the recursion theorem and difficulties associated with formalization of the syntax are probably the reasonwhy to this
day there exists only one prover based on set theory used in practice to reason about programs [1]. Due to its closed nature,
its capabilities are unclear.
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• (IN) ∀a, b. a ∈ b ↔ ∃c. c ∈I b ∧ a = c
• (EQ) ∀a, b. a = b ↔ ∀d. (d ∈I a → d ∈ b) ∧ (d ∈I b → d ∈ a)
• (EMPTY) ∀c. c ∈I ∅ ↔ ⊥
• (PAIR) ∀a, b∀c. c ∈I {a, b} ↔ c = a ∨ c = b
• (OMEGA) ∀c. c ∈I ω↔ c = ∅ ∨ ∃b ∈ ω. c = b ∪ {b, b}
• (SEPφ(p,a,f⃗ )) ∀f⃗ , a∀c. c ∈I Sφ(p,a,f⃗ )(a, f⃗ )↔ (p : c ∈ a) ∧ φ(p, c, f⃗ )
• (UNION) ∀a∀c. c ∈I  a ↔ ∃b ∈ a. c ∈ b
• (POWER) ∀a∀c. c ∈I P(a)↔ ∀b. b ∈ c → b ∈ a
• (REPLφ(p,a,b,f⃗ )) ∀f⃗ , a∀c. c ∈I Rφ(p,a,b,f⃗ )(a, f⃗ )↔ (∀x. (p : x ∈ a)→ ∃!y. φ(p, x, y, f⃗ )) ∧ (∃x. (p : x ∈ a) ∧ φ(p, x, c, f⃗ ))
• (INDφ(a,f⃗ )) ∀f⃗ . (∀a. (∀b. b ∈I a → φ(b, f⃗ ))→ φ(a, f⃗ ))→ ∀a. φ(a, f⃗ )
Fig. 1. The axioms of IZFT .
P ::= x | λx. P | 0 | S(P) | casenat(P,Q , x.R) [◦] ::= [◦] P | casenat([◦] ,Q , x.R)
(λx. P) O → O[x := P] casenat(0,Q , x.R)→ Q
casenat(S(P),Q , x.R)→ R[x := casenat(P,Q , x.R)]
Γ ⊢ 0 : nat
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ S(P) : nat
Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : φ Γ , x : φ ⊢ R : φ
Γ ⊢ casenat(P,Q , x.R) : φ
Fig. 2. The programming language P .
These difficulties can be removed by using a logic designed with programs in mind, such as HOL, type theory or MinLog.
The price to pay, however, is expressiveness and easiness of use. HOL is a very weak logic. The strongest modern applied
type theories are much weaker than ZFC, the standard foundation of mathematics. It also remains to be seen whether types
can repeat the remarkable success of sets as a foundational basis and tool for abstraction.
We propose a framework D, which unifies sets and programs, and at the same time provides a solution to these problems
along with extra benefits. Briefly, D unifies a lazy programming language P with impredicative constructive set theory IZF
with Replacement (IZFR), using weakly dependent logic. Since P is an integral part of the logic, no time is lost on formalizing
syntax and semantics. As the framework unifies sets and programs, the logic available for reasoning about the programs
is the standard set theory. In this way D supports the post-construction verification paradigm — it is possible to write the
program first and then use set theory to reason about it.
Furthermore, D possesses all properties desirable from the proof-theoretic point of view, including Subject Reduction,
Progress and Normalization. Therefore, as we showed in the previous work [7,21], it also supports the correct-by-
construction paradigm: programs can be extracted from set theoretic proofs. Moreover, D makes it possible to state and
prove the properties of Program Extraction directly inside of D, instead of using convoluted metatheoretical constructions.
Finally, the combination significantly influences the set-theoretical side.We show thatD is stronger than IZFR, by showing
that a countable version of the Axiom of Choice is derivable in D. The result implies that the real numbers behave in D in a
much better way than in IZFR.
We assume knowledge of standard notions of logic, programming languages and set theory. Background material on
these topics can be found in [15,27,24].
This paper is organized as follows. We present D in Sections 2 and 3, prove its normalization in Section 4 and develop
mathematics in D in Section 5. Therein we show how sets influence programs and programs influence sets. Related work is
discussed in Section 6.
2. The informal account of D
In this section we present our framework D informally. The fully formal account follows in Section 3. D is based on
two pillars: a dependent variant of constructive set theory IZFR, which we call IZFT , and a lazy, functional programming
language, which we call P . The framework unifies these two worlds together. As we shall see in Section 5, the unification
makes it possible to use set theory to reason about programs of P and for the computation in P to influence set theory.
The theory IZFR, first introduced by Myhill [23], is a constructive counterpart of ZF set theory in its version with
Replacement. IZFT is a dependent extension of IZFR. The underlying logic of IZFT is the constructive first-order logic extended
with dependent conjunctions, dependent implications and the type of natural numbers.
The axioms of IZFT are the same as in [22]: Empty Set, Pairing, Infinity, Union, Power Set, ∈-Induction, dependent
Separation and dependent Replacement. They are listed in Figure 1. As usual [22,21], an intensional membership relation ∈I
is used as a building block for Extensionality and Leibniz axioms.
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The programming language P is a simple lazy lambda calculus, with natural numbers and the recursion combinator. We
summarize it in Figure 2. Our framework does not dependheavily on the choice of P; any reasonable functional programming
language with type-theoretic semantics could be used instead.
Just as the set-theoretical layer of D makes it possible to reason about equality of sets, its programming part makes it
possible to reason about computational equivalence of programs. We define the relation of computational equivalence as
the smallest contextually closed equivalence relation on programs containing the reduction relation. We write P ≡ Q , if P
is computationally equivalent to Q . For example, 0 ≡ 0, (λx. x) 0 ≡ 0 and λy. (λx. x) 0 ≡ λy. 0.
The most difficult part of D to state informally is the glue between the world of programming languages and the world
of sets. If the reader feels that our presentation is too informal, we recommend skipping to Section 3. We adopt the notation
M : φ for the fact thatM is a proof of φ. As D is a dependent theory, these judgments are as integral to D as set-theoretical
membership formulas A ∈ B. We can readM : φ as ‘‘M is a proof of φ’’ or ‘‘M proves φ’’.
First, for any program P of type nat, there is a corresponding element ofω, whichwe denote by P . We define this injecting
map so that 0 = ∅, S(P) = P ∪ {P} (recall that in set theory, n ∪ {n} denotes n + 1) and so that it is a homomorphism wrt
computational equivalence and set equality: if P ≡ Q , then P = Q .
Second, ifM : t ∈ ω, then there is a corresponding program prog(M) of type nat. This map is defined so that ifM : ∅ ∈ ω,
then prog(M) ≡ 0 and if M : t ∪ {t} ∈ ω, then prog(M) ≡ S(prog(N)), where N : t ∈ ω results from M in a natural way.
Finally, ifM,N,O prove t ∈ ω, u ∈ ω and t = u, respectively, then prog(M) ≡ prog(N).
Although D might seem overwhelming at the first sight, we think these are necessary ingredients to make D a proof-
theoretically solid setting, while at the same time a powerful programming language. Thanks to our axioms, a programmer
can for example freely mix prog(M) terms with numbers entered by user, as they both exist on equal grounds. We hope an
implementation of D would make an impact on bringing set theory closer to students, as it would enable them to play and
program directly with set-theoretic objects, in addition to seeing them as static objects in textbooks and on blackboards.
The reader might want to skim Section 5 to see how D is used in mathematics, before delving into formalities of the next
section.
3. The formal account of D
In this section we provide more detailed presentation of D. While it is essentially self-contained, our previous work [21]
provides ample extra background on the design of the system.
3.1. The terms of D
The terms of D are divided into four syntactic categories, encompassing proof terms, programs, set terms and formulas.
We will generally use lettersM,N,O for proof terms, P,Q for programs, s, t, u for set terms, φ,ψ, ϑ for formulas and T , S
for arbitrary terms. There are two kinds of variables. The first one, denoted by letters p, q, r, x, y intuitively corresponds to
the propositional part of the logic. We call them proof variables. The second one, usually denoted by letters a, b, c , intuitively
corresponds to the first-order quantification. We call them first-order variables. The notation a, b.M stands for a term with
its variables a, b bound. The notation T⃗ stands for a sequence of terms. The free variables of a termM are denoted by FV (M).
The terms of D are defined by means of an abstract grammar. The first part of the grammar generates the proof terms.
There are three groups of proof terms. The first group of the proof terms corresponds to the first-order logic with dependent
features:
M ::= p |M N | λp.M | inl(M) | inr(M) | case(M, p. N, p. O) |
fst(M) | snd(M) | < M,N > |magic(M) | λ ∗ .M |
let [∗, p] := M in N | [∗,M] |M ∗ | | in(P) | ax
Note that the first-order variables and set terms are not present in the proof terms. Instead, they are replaced by ∗, a new
symbol of the language. This is because in set theory, the computational content of the first-order quantification and terms
is mostly nonexistent. This can be seen for example in McCarty’s realizability definition [17] or in our erasure maps [19,22].
We hope to investigate this topic further in the future.
The in(P) term intuitively denotes the proof of the fact that P ∈I ω. The ax term denotes proofs of computational
equivalences and is similar to the Ax term of Nuprl [6].
The second group of the proof terms corresponds to the axioms of IZFT :
inProp(M) | inRep(M) | eqProp(M) | eqRep(M) |
emptyProp(M) | emptyRep(M) | pairProp(M) | pairRep(M) |
unionProp(M) | unionRep(M) | sepp,a,f⃗ .φProp(M) | sepp,a,f⃗ .φRep(M) |
powerProp(M) | powerRep(M) | omegaProp(M) | omegaRep(M)
replp,a,b,f⃗ .φProp(M) | replp,a,b,f⃗ .φRep(M) | ind(M)
Intuitively, the Prop and Rep terms correspond to IZFT axioms. For example, if M is a proof of t ∈I P(u), then
powerProp(M) is a proof of t ⊆ u and if M is a proof of t ⊆ u, then powerRep(M) is a proof of t ∈I P(u). As in our
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previous work [19,22,21], we adopt the convention of using axRep and axProp terms to tacitly mean all Rep and Prop terms,
for ax being one of in, eq, empty, pair, union, sep, power, omega and repl. With this convention in mind, we can summarize
the definition of the set-theoretic Prop and Rep terms as
axProp(M) | axRep(M).
The third group of proof terms governs interaction between programs and sets.
inzRep(M) | inzProp(M) | insRep(M) | insProp(M) | eqpRep(M)
Roughly, the proof terms inzRep(M), inzProp(M)witness 0 being the empty set, the proof terms insRep(M), insProp(M)
witness S(P) being the same thing as P ∪ {P} and eqpRep(M) is used for a computational version of the Leibniz axiom. The
type system in Section 3.3 will make these remarks precise.
Having finished describing the proof terms, we proceed to programs:
P ::= x | λx. P | P Q | 0 | S(P) | casenat(P,Q , x.R) | prog(M)
This is a simple lambda calculus with natural numbers, which can be viewed as an extension of Gödel’s system T in a
version with iterator. The only new thing is the prog(M) term. The prog(M) term intuitively for any M : t ∈ ω denotes
the natural number corresponding to t . This intuition will be validated by the reduction rules of P and the proof-theoretic
properties of our framework. We will not use the prog(M) terms forM which are not proofs of t ∈ ω.
Definition 3.1. A numeral is either 0 or S(n), where n is a numeral.
The third part of the grammar generates the set terms:
t ::= a | ∅ | {t1, t2} | ω | P(t) |

t | Sp,a,f⃗ .φ(t, t⃗) | Rp,a,b,f⃗ .φ(t, t⃗) | P
The Sp,a,f⃗ .φ(t, t⃗) and Rp,a,b,f⃗ .φ(t, t⃗) terms correspond to the sets defined by the dependent Separation and Replacement
axioms, as shown in Figure 1. The P term intuitively denotes the member of ω corresponding to the program P . As in [22],
we will use the notation tA(u⃗) for the term corresponding to the axiom A, so for example tPOWER(u) is P(u).
The last part generates the formulas of D.
φ ::= ⊥ | nat | P ≡ Q | t ∈I u | t = u | t ∈ u |
(p : φ)→ ψ | (p : φ) ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | ∀a. φ | ∃a. φ
The formulas (p : φ)→ ψ and (p : φ)∧ψ are dependent versions of implication and conjunction. The variable p binds in
ψ , which can mention p (inside of prog(M) terms). Traditional implication and conjunction, φ → ψ and φ ∧ψ , are defined
as abbreviations for (p : φ) → ψ and (p : φ) ∧ ψ , where p is fresh. We call a formula simple if it is built of only nat and
propositional connectives. We will use letters σ , τ exclusively for simple formulas.
There are two new atomic formulas which go beyond the dependent first-order logic. First, the inclusion of the
formula/type nat among formulas makes it possible to use the machinery of the first-order logic to define types in P , via
the Curry–Howard correspondence principle. Second, we allow reasoning about computational equivalence of programs by
means of the formula P ≡ Q . The proof system in Section 3.3 should shed more light on these issues.
That programs and proof terms are separate syntactic categories in our system is mostly a design choice. If one looked
hard enough, one could find proof terms behaving similarly to programs from a computational point of view. However, the
separation makes it possible to apply our framework easily to more complicated programming languages — it would be
a simple exercise to extend P to incorporate pairs, lists, algebraic datatypes and other features met in modern functional
programming languages.
3.2. The reduction relation
The reduction relation, denoted by→, is deterministic and defined on proof terms and programs. It arises from reduction
rules and evaluation contexts. In the reduction rules, we will use several proof terms corresponding to proofs of simple set-
theoretic facts.
The first proof term, which we denote by eqRefl, corresponds to the proof of the fact that ∀a. a = a. In such situations,
we will write simply.
Lemma 3.2. eqRefl : ∀a. a = a.
Proof. See Lemma 4.1 in [22] for the informal proof and apply Lemma 5.10 therein to obtain the corresponding proof
term. 
Formally, of course, these terms cannot be considered proofs of the respective lemmas before the proof system is
introduced in Section 3.3; however, we prefer this exposition to giving the reader nothing but proof terms.
Lemma 3.3. ii : ∀a, b. a ∈I b → a ∈ b.
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Proof. Same as in Lemma 3.2, but use Corollary 4.2 from [22] instead. This time, we show the proof term for the future
benefit.
ii ≡ λ∗, ∗. λp. inRep([∗, < p, eqRefl ∗ >]) 
Lemma 3.4. zz : 0 = ∅.
Lemma 3.5 (Program Schema). ss : S(P) = P ∪ {P}.
Proof.
zz ≡ eqRep(λ ∗ . < λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p), λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) >)
ss ≡ eqRep(λ ∗ . < λp. ii ∗ ∗ insProp(p), λp. ii ∗ ∗ insRep(p) >) 
Now we can present the reduction rules. To avoid cluttering of the rules (and later also proofs), from now on we adopt
the convention of using the _ character to denote the subterms which are of no use to the definition/proof in question.
The reduction rules are designed tomake the Progress and Subject Reduction lemmas provable. The first group is standard
[21] for constructive set theories:
(λp.M) N → M[p := N] fst(< M, _ >)→ M snd(< _,N >)→ N
case(inl(M), p. N, p. _)→ N[p := M] case(inr(M), p. _, p. O)→ O[p := M]
(λ ∗ .M) ∗ → M let [∗, p] := [∗,M] in N → N[x := M]
axProp(axRep(M))→ M ind(M)→ λ ∗ .M ∗ (λ ∗ .λx. ind(M) ∗)
There are two new rules governing the behavior of new proof terms, transforming the natural numbers of P into corre-
sponding proofs of IZFT .
in(0)→ omegaRep(inl(zz))
in(S(P))→ omegaRep(inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss >]))
Furthermore, programs reduce as well, in the expected way:
(λx.P) O → O[x := P]
casenat(0,Q , x._)→ Q casenat(S(P),Q , x.R)→ R[x := casenat(P,Q , x.R)]
Finally, we show the two rules governing the behavior of programs coming from set theory:
prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inl(_)), _ >])) → 0
prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >])) → S(prog(ii ∗ ∗M))
We call the reduction rules specified so far atomic. To extend these rules to all proof terms, we use the standard tool of
evaluation contexts [24]. The evaluation contexts of P describe the call-by-need (lazy) evaluation order:
[◦] ::= fst([◦]) | snd([◦]) | case([◦], _, _) | in([◦]) | axProp([◦]) | [◦] _ |
[◦] ∗ |magic([◦]) | let [∗, p] := [◦] in _ |
casenat([◦], _, _) | prog([◦]) | prog(inRep([◦])) | prog(inRep([∗, [◦]])) |
prog(inRep([∗, < [◦], _ >])) | prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep([◦]), _ >])) |
prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([◦])), _ >])) |
prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, [◦]])), _ >]))
The reason for the large number of rules governing the behavior of prog(_) terms is that the subtermsneed to be evaluated
in order to reach the form allowing the application of one of the atomic reduction rules.
We distinguish certain terms, listed below, as values.
λ_. _ | inr(_) | inl(_) | [_, _] | < _, _ > | axRep(_) | 0 | S(P) | ax
Definition 3.6. Wewrite T ↓ if the unique reduction sequence starting from T terminates. If T ↓, we say that T normalizes.
We write T ↓ v, if v is the value T terminates at. We write T →∗ S if T reduces to S in some number of steps.
Definition 3.7. Let→N define the non-deterministic version of→, where atomic reductions can take place anywhere in
the term. The relation≈ is the smallest equivalence relation on programs containing→N . We call a value v complete if for
no term T , v →N T .
An example of a value which is not complete is S((λx. x) 0).
Lemma 3.8 (Church–Rosser). The→N relation is confluent: if T →∗N T1 and T →∗N T2, then for some S, T1 →∗N S and T2 →∗N S.
Proof. The framework D viewed as a higher-order rewriting system is very well-behaved — all the rules are left-linear
patterns and there are no critical pairs. Such systems are confluent. See for example Theorem 6.11 in [18] for details. 
Corollary 3.9. If P ≈ P ′, P →∗N v, P ′ →∗N v′ and v, v′ are complete, then v = v′.
Proof. Standard. See for example [5]. 
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3.3. The proof system of D
We now introduce the proof system for D. Contexts, denoted by Γ , are finite sets of pairs (p, φ), where p is a proof
variable and φ is a formula. The domain of a context Γ = p1 : φ1, . . . , pn : φn, denoted by dom(Γ ), is the set {p1, . . . , pn}.
The range of Γ , denoted by ran(Γ ), is the set {φ1, . . . , φn}. The typing system is used to derive the judgments Γ ⊢ T : S,
read as ‘‘in environment Γ , T is of type S’’ or as ‘‘in environment Γ , T proves S’’, where S is either a formula or a kind— one
of {Set, Form}. Kinds are used to ensure the programs, terms and formulas we use are well-formed.
The first group of rules describes valid dependent set-theoretic terms and formulas. Let ΨR(φ, t, t⃗) denote the formula
defining Rp,a,b,f⃗ . φ(t, t⃗), that is
ΨR(φ, t, t⃗) ≡ (∀a. (p : a ∈ t)→ ∃!b. φ[f⃗ := t⃗]) ∧ (∃a. (p : a ∈ t) ∧ φ[b := c, f⃗ := t⃗])
The rules follow:
Γ ⊢ a : Set a a first-order variable
Γ ⊢ u⃗ : Set
Γ ⊢ tA(u⃗) : Set
Γ ⊢ (p : c ∈ t) ∧ φ[f⃗ := t⃗] : Form Γ ⊢ t : Set Γ ⊢ t⃗ : Set
Γ ⊢ Sp,c,f⃗ . φ(t, t⃗) : Set
Γ ⊢ ΨR(φ, t, t⃗) : Form Γ ⊢ t : Set Γ ⊢ t⃗ : Set
Γ ⊢ Rp,a,b,f⃗ . φ(t, t⃗) : Set
Γ ⊢ P : τ Γ ⊢ Q : σ
Γ ⊢ P ≡ Q : Form
Γ ⊢ t : Set Γ ⊢ u : Set
Γ ⊢ t u : Form  ∈ {∈I ,∈,=}
Γ ⊢ ⊥ : Form
Γ ⊢ φ : Form Γ ⊢ ψ : Form
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ : Form
Γ , p : φ ⊢ ψ : Form
Γ ⊢ (p : φ)ψ : Form  ∈ {∧,→}
Γ ⊢ φ : Form
Γ ⊢ Qa. φ : Form Q ∈ {∀, ∃}
The second group of rules corresponds to the first-order logic with dependent implications and conjunctions.
Γ ⊢ φ : Form
Γ , p : φ ⊢ p : φ p /∈ dom(Γ ) ∪ FV (Γ , φ)
Γ , p : φ ⊢ M : ψ
Γ ⊢ λp.M : (p : φ)→ ψ
Γ ⊢ M : (p : φ)→ ψ Γ ⊢ N : φ
Γ ⊢ M N : ψ[p := N]
Γ ⊢ M : φ Γ , p : φ ⊢ ψ : Form Γ ⊢ N : ψ[p := M]
Γ ⊢< M,N >: (p : φ) ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ M : (p : φ) ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ fst(M) : φ
Γ ⊢ M : (p : φ) ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ snd(M) : ψ[p := fst(M)]
Γ ⊢ M : φ Γ ⊢ ψ : Form
Γ ⊢ inl(M) : φ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ M : ψ Γ ⊢ φ : Form
Γ ⊢ inr(M) : φ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ M : φ ∨ ψ Γ , p : φ ⊢ N : ϑ Γ , p : ψ ⊢ O : ϑ
Γ ⊢ case(M, p. N, p. O) : ϑ
Γ ⊢ M : φ[a := t]
Γ ⊢ [∗,M] : ∃a. φ
Γ ⊢ M : ∃a. φ Γ , p : φ ⊢ N : ψ
Γ ⊢ let [∗, p] := M in N : ψ a, p /∈ FV (Γ , ψ)
Γ ⊢ M : φ
Γ ⊢ λ ∗ .M : ∀a. φ a /∈ FV (Γ )
Γ ⊢ M : ∀a. φ Γ ⊢ t : Set
Γ ⊢ M ∗ : φ[a := t]
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Γ ⊢ M : ⊥
Γ ⊢ magic(M) : φ
The second group of rules corresponds to the axioms of set theory.
Γ ⊢ M : φA(t, u⃗)
Γ ⊢ axRep(M) : t ∈I tA(u⃗)
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I tA(u⃗)
Γ ⊢ axProp(M) : φA(t, u⃗)
Γ ⊢ M : ∀d. (d ∈I t → d ∈ u) ∧ (d ∈I u → d ∈ t)
Γ ⊢ eqRep(M) : t = u
Γ ⊢ M : t = u
Γ ⊢ eqProp(M) : ∀d. (d ∈I t → d ∈ u) ∧ (d ∈I u → d ∈ t)
Γ ⊢ M : ∃c. c ∈I u ∧ t = c
Γ ⊢ inRep(M) : t ∈ u
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈ u
Γ ⊢ inProp(M) : ∃c. c ∈I u ∧ t = c
Γ ⊢ M : ∀c. (∀b. b ∈I c → φ[a, f⃗ := b, t⃗])→ φ[a, f⃗ := c, t⃗]
Γ ⊢ ind(M) : ∀a. φ[f⃗ := t⃗]
The fourth group of rules describes the typing system for the programs.
Γ ⊢ 0 : nat
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ S(P) : nat
Γ , x : τ ⊢ P : σ
Γ ⊢ λx. P : τ → σ
Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : τ Γ , x : τ ⊢ R : τ
Γ ⊢ casenat(P,Q , x.R) : τ
The rules governing computational equivalence follow closely:
Γ ⊢ P : τ Γ ⊢ Q : τ
Γ ⊢ ax : P ≡ Q P → Q atomic
Γ ⊢ P : τ
Γ ⊢ ax : P ≡ P
Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q
Γ ⊢ ax : Q ≡ P
Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q Γ ⊢ _ : Q ≡ R
Γ ⊢ ax : P ≡ R
Γ , x : τ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q
Γ ⊢ ax : λx. P ≡ λx. Q
Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : τ Γ , x : τ ⊢ _ : R ≡ S
Γ ⊢ ax : casenat(P,Q , x.R) ≡ casenat(P,Q , x.S)
Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q Γ , x : τ ⊢ R : σ
Γ ⊢ ax : R[x := P] ≡ R[x := Q ]
Finally, we present the novel part introduced in D: the rules glueing programs and sets together.
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ P : Set
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ in(P) : P ∈I ω
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I ∅
Γ ⊢ inzRep(M) : t ∈I 0
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I 0
Γ ⊢ inzProp(M) : t ∈I ∅
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I P ∪ {P}
Γ ⊢ insRep(M) : t ∈I S(P)
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I S(P)
Γ ⊢ insProp(M) : t ∈I P ∪ {P}
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I P Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : nat
Γ ⊢ eqpRep(M) : t ∈I Q
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈ ω Γ ⊢ t : Set
Γ ⊢ prog(M) : nat
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈ ω Γ ⊢ N : u ∈ ω Γ ⊢ O : t = u
Γ ⊢ ax : prog(M) ≡ prog(N)
Theorem 3.10. D ⊢ IZFR
Proof. Straightforward. One can simply note that the part of λZω from [22] corresponding to IZFR is essentially a subsystem
of D. 
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3.4. Properties of D
In this section, we list several standard properties of our system, which show that it makes sense from the proof-
theoretical point of view. The proofs are mostly standard. We start by providing formal proofs of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.
Lemma 3.11. zz : 0 = ∅.
Proof. Let T be the following proof tree:
. . .
p : d ∈I 0 ⊢ ii ∗ ∗ : d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ ∅
p : d ∈I 0 ⊢ p : d ∈I 0
p : d ∈I 0 ⊢ inzProp(p) : d ∈I ∅
p : d ∈I 0 ⊢ ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p) : d ∈ ∅
⊢ λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p) : d ∈I 0→ d ∈ ∅
Let S be the following proof tree:
. . .
p : d ∈I ∅ ⊢ ii ∗ ∗ : d ∈I 0→ d ∈ 0
p : d ∈I ∅ ⊢ p : d ∈I ∅
p : d ∈I ∅ ⊢ inzRep(p) : d ∈I 0
p : d ∈I ∅ ⊢ ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) : d ∈ 0
⊢ λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) : d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ 0
LetM = λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p), let N = λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p). Then the following proof tree shows the claim.
T S
⊢< M,N >: (d ∈I 0→ d ∈ ∅) ∧ (d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ 0)
⊢ λ ∗ . < M,N >: ∀d. (d ∈I 0→ d ∈ ∅) ∧ (d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ 0)
⊢ eqRep(λ ∗ . < M,N >) : 0 = ∅ 
Lemma 3.12 (Program Schema). ss : S(P) = P ∪ {P}.
Proof. Essentially the same as of the previous lemma. 
Lemma 3.13 (Weakening). Suppose Γ ⊢ M : φ. If Γ ⊢ Ψ : Form and {p} ∪ FV (ψ) are fresh to the proof tree Γ ⊢ M : φ, then
Γ , p : ψ ⊢ M : φ.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the proof tree. 
Lemma 3.14 (Propositional Substitution Lemma). The following rule is admissible, that is if the premises hold, so does the
conclusion.
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ S : Φ Γ ⊢ T : Ψ
Γ [q := T ] ⊢ S[q := T ] : Φ[q := T ] q /∈ FV (Ψ )
Proof. Standard. There are no new features of D which can unfavorably interact with substitution lemmas. The proof
proceeds by straightforward induction on the derivation of Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ S : φ. We show some representative cases. In
the proof, for any term T , T ′ denotes T [q := T ] and Γ ′ denotes Γ [q := T ]. The case of the last rule in the proof tree
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ S : Φ:
•
Γ ⊢ φ : Form
Γ , p : φ ⊢ p : φ p /∈ dom(Γ ) ∪ FV (Γ , φ)
There are two possible cases:
– If p is q, then Ψ is φ and we need to show Γ [q := T ] ⊢ T : φ[q := T ]. Since q /∈ Γ ∪ FV (Γ , φ), the claim follows.
– Suppose p is not q. By the induction hypothesis, Γ ′ ⊢ φ′ : Form. The following proof tree shows the claim:
Γ ′ ⊢ φ′ : Form
Γ ′, p : φ′ ⊢ p : φ′•
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ M : (p : φ1)→ φ2 Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ N : φ1
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ M N : φ2[p := N]
By the induction hypothesis, choosing p to be fresh, Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ : (p : φ′1) → φ′2 and Γ ′ ⊢ N ′ : φ′1. Therefore
Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ N ′ : φ′2[p := M ′]. Since φ′2[p := M ′] = (φ2[p := M])′, we have Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ N ′ : (φ2[p := M])′ and the
claim follows.
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•
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ M : φ
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ λ ∗ .M : ∀a. φ a /∈ FV (Γ )
Choose a to be fresh. By the induction hypothesis, Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ : φ′. Since a /∈ FV (Γ , T ), the claim follows.
•
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ M : ∀a. φ Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ t : Set
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ M ∗ : φ[a := t]
By the induction hypothesis, choosing a to be fresh, Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ : (∀a. φ)′, so also Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ : ∀a. φ′. Furthermore,
Γ ′ ⊢ t ′ : Set. Therefore Γ ′ ⊢ M ′ ∗ : φ′[a := t ′], so also Γ ′ ⊢ (M ∗)′ : (φ[a := t])′.
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ P : τ Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ Q : τ
Γ , q : Ψ ⊢ ax : P ≡ Q P → Q atomic
All we need to show is that atomic reductions respect substitutions: if P → Q , then P ′ → Q ′. The proof is standard, see
for example Lemma 1.3.8. in [27] for a detailed proof for pure lambda calculus.
•
Γ , x : τ ⊢ P ≡ Q
Γ ⊢ λx. P ≡ λx. Q
By the induction hypothesis, Γ ′, x : τ ⊢ P ′ ≡ Q ′. Therefore also Γ ⊢ λx. P ′ ≡ λx. Q ′.
•
Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q Γ , x : nat ⊢ R : nat
Γ ⊢ ax : R[x := P] ≡ R[x := Q ]
By the induction hypothesis Γ ′ ⊢ _ : P ′ ≡ Q ′ and Γ ′, x : nat ⊢ R′ : nat. Since (R[x := P])′ = R′[x := P ′] and
(R[x := Q ])′ = R′[x := Q ′], the claim follows. 
Lemma 3.15 (First-Order Substitution Lemma). The following rule is admissible:
Γ ⊢ O : φ
Γ [a := t] ⊢ O : φ[a := t]
Proof. Note that O = O[a := t], since the proof terms do not have first-order variables, the statement is equivalent to that
of Lemma 5.5 in [22]. A routine proof by induction on the height of the proof tree Γ ⊢ O : φ shows the claim. 
Lemma 3.16 (Canonical Forms). Suppose ⊢ v : Ψ and v is a value. Then case Ψ :
• (p : φ)→ ψ . Then v = λp.M.
• φ ∨ ψ . Then v = inl(M) or inr(M).
• ∃a. φ. Then v = [∗,M].
• nat. Then v is a numeral.
• t ∈ ω. Then v = inRep(M).
• t ∈I ω. Then v = omegaRep(M).
Proof. Straightforward inspection of the possible values and proof rules. 
Lemma 3.17 (Progress). If ⊢ O : Ψ then either O is a value or O → P.
Proof. Induction on the length of O. We show some interesting cases compared to [22]. Case O:
• M N . Then ⊢ M N : Ψ , so for some φ,ψ , ⊢ M : (p : φ1) → φ2, so by the induction hypothesis, either M is a value or
M → M ′. In the latter caseM N → M ′ N . In the former, by Canonical Forms,M = λp.M1, soM N → M1[p := N].
• in(R). Then ⊢ R : nat, so by the induction hypothesis, either R → R′ whence in(R)→ in(R′), or R is a value. In the latter
case, by Canonical Forms R is a numeral, so one of the reduction rules for the in(R) terms applies.
• prog(M). This case amounts to tedious chasing of evaluation contexts for prog(M) terms.
Since⊢ M : t ∈ ω, by the induction hypothesis, eitherM → M ′ orM is a value. In the former case, the claim follows. In
the latter, by Canonical Forms,M = inRep(N), so for some t ,⊢ N : ∃a. a ∈I ω∧a = t . If N is not a value, by the induction
hypothesis N → N ′, so also prog(inRep(N)) → prog(inRep(N ′)). If N is a value, by Canonical Forms it is of the form
[∗,O], so for some u, we have ⊢ O : u ∈I ω ∧ u = t . If O is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis O → O′, so also
prog(inRep([∗,O])→ prog(inRep([∗,O′])). IfO is a value, then by Canonical Forms it is of the form< O1, _ >. IfO1 is not
a value, then by the induction hypothesis O1 → O′1, so also prog(inRep([∗, < O1, _ >])→ prog(inRep([∗, < O′1, _ >]).
IfO1 is a value, then⊢ O1 : u ∈I ω and by Canonical FormsO1 = omegaRep(O2). IfO2 is not a value, then by the induction
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hypothesis, O2 → O′2, so also prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(O2), _ >])→ prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(O′2), _ >]). If O2
is a value, then ⊢ O2 : u = 0 ∨ ∃a. a ∈ ω ∧ u = a ∪ {a} and by Canonical Forms either O2 = inl(O3) or O2 = inr(O3).
In the former case, prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inl(O3)), _ >])→ 0. In the latter, if O3 is not a value, by the induction
hypothesis O3 → O′3 and prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr(O3)), _ >])→ prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr(O′3)), _ >]).
If O3 is a value, then ⊢ O3 : ∃a. a ∈ ω ∧ u = a ∪ {a} and by Canonical Forms, O3 = [∗,O4]. If O4 is not a value, then
by the induction hypothesis O4 → O′4, so also prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗,O4])), _ >]) → prog(inRep([∗, <
omegaRep(inr([∗,O′4])), _ >]). If O4 is a value, then since for some s, ⊢ O4 : s ∈ ω ∧ u = s ∪ {s}, by Canonical Forms
O4 =< O5, _ >, so prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < O5, _ >])), _ >])→ S(prog(O5)). This shows the claim. 
Lemma 3.18 (Subject Reduction). If Γ ⊢ S : Ψ and S → T , then Γ ⊢ T : Ψ .
Proof. By induction on the definition of→. We show some interesting cases. Case S → T :
• (λp.M) N → M[p := N]. Choose p to be fresh. The proof tree must end with:
Γ , p : φ ⊢ M : ψ
Γ ⊢ λp.M : (p : φ)→ ψ Γ ⊢ N : φ
Γ ⊢ (λp.M) N : ψ[p := N]
for some φ,ψ such that Ψ = ψ[p := N]. By the Propositional Substitution Lemma and the choice of p, Γ [p := N] ⊢
M[p := N] : ψ[p := N]. Since pwas fresh, Γ [p := N] = Γ and the claim follows.
• (λ ∗ .M) ∗ → M . The proof tree must end with:
Γ ⊢ M : φ
Γ ⊢ λ ∗ .M : ∀a. φ Γ ⊢ t : Set
Γ ⊢ (λ ∗ .M) ∗ : φ[a := t]
for some t such that Ψ = φ[a := t]. By the First-Order Substitution Lemma, Γ [a := t] ⊢ M : φ[a := t]. Since we may
assume awas fresh, the claim follows.
• let [∗, p] := [∗,M] in N → N[p := M]. The proof tree must end with:
Γ ⊢ M : φ[a := t]
Γ ⊢ [∗.M] : ∃a. φ Γ , p : φ ⊢ N : ψ
Γ ⊢ let [∗, p] := [∗,M] in N : ψ
for some t, φ, ψ , where Ψ = ψ and where a /∈ FV (Γ , ψ). By the First-Order Substitution Lemma, Γ [a := t], p : φ[a :=
t] ⊢ N : ψ[a := t]. Since a /∈ FV (Γ , ψ), we have Γ , p : φ[a := t] ⊢ N : ψ . By the Propositional Substitution Lemma,
Γ [p := M] ⊢ N[p := M] : ψ[p := M]. Since p /∈ FV (Γ , ψ), the claim follows.
• in(0)→ omegaRep(inl(zz)). Then Ψ = 0 ∈I ω. The following proof tree shows the claim.
Γ ⊢ zz : 0 = ∅
Γ ⊢ inl(zz) : 0 = ∅ ∨ _
Γ ⊢ omegaRep(inl(zz)) : 0 ∈I ω
• in(S(P))→ omegaRep(inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss >])). Then Ψ = S(P) ∈I ω. We have
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ S(P) : nat
Γ ⊢ in(S(P)) : S(P) ∈I ω
Thus the following proof tree shows the claim:
. . .
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ in(P) : P ∈I ω
Γ ⊢ ii ∗ ∗ in(P) : P ∈ ω Γ ⊢ ss : S(P) = P ∪ {P}
Γ ⊢< ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss >: P ∈ ω ∧ S(P) = P ∪ {P}
Γ ⊢ [∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss >] : ∃d. d ∈ ω ∧ S(P) = d ∪ {d}
Γ ⊢ inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss ∗] >)) : S(P) = 0 ∨ ∃d. d ∈I ω ∧ S(P) = d ∪ {d}
Γ ⊢ omegaRep(inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(P), ss] >)) : S(P) ∈I ω
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• prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inl(_)), _ >]))→ 0. An inspection of the proof rules reveals that the proof tree must end
with:
Γ ⊢ prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inl(_)), _ >])) : nat
Hence the claim follows.
• prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >]))→ S(prog(ii ∗ ∗M))).
The proof tree must end with:
Γ ⊢ M : e ∈I ω . . .
Γ ⊢< M, _ >: e ∈I ω ∧ e = d
Γ ⊢ [∗, < M, _ >] : ∃e. e ∈I ω ∧ e = d
Γ ⊢ inr([∗, < M, _ >]) : d = 0 ∨ ∃e. e ∈I ω ∧ e = d
Γ ⊢ omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])) : d ∈I ω . . .
Γ ⊢< omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >: d ∈I ω ∧ t = d
Γ ⊢ [∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >] : ∃d. d ∈I ω ∧ t = d
Γ ⊢ inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >]) : t ∈ ω
Γ ⊢ prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < M, _ >])), _ >])) : nat
The following proof tree shows the claim:
Γ ⊢ M : e ∈I ω
Γ ⊢ ii ∗ ∗M : e ∈ ω
Γ ⊢ prog(ii ∗ ∗M) : nat
Γ ⊢ S(prog(ii ∗ ∗M)) : nat 
Corollary 3.19. If ⊢ M : ⊥, then M does not normalize.
Proof. There is no value v such that ⊢ v : ⊥. Therefore by Progress, for some N , M → N . By Subject Reduction ⊢ N : ⊥.
This process can be repeated forever. 
4. Normalization
In this section, we will show that D normalizes. The tool we use to prove normalization is realizability, which we used
for the same purpose and in a similar way in our previous work [19,22,21]. Throughout the section we work in ZF.
4.1. Realizability
We first present the definition of realizability.
Definition 4.1. A realizer is either a closed proof term or a closed program.
As usual, we will utilize an erasure map on realizers. The map takes a realizer T and returns its erasure, denoted by Te. It
is defined as follows. For any realizer T , Te is defined as T with all occurrences of insRep(M), insProp(M) and eqpRep(M)
replaced by (λp. p)M .
Lemma 4.2. If Te ↓, then T ↓.
Proof. Straightforward — erasure can only add redexes. 
Remark. In our previous work, the main purpose of erasure maps was to eliminate unnecessary first-order content from
the proof terms in order to streamline the normalization proof. This is the first time it interacts with propositional proof
terms.
Let Val denote the set of all realizers in D which are values.
Definition 4.3. A set A is a λ-name iff A is a set of pairs (v, B) such that v ∈ Val and B is a λ-name.
In other words, λ-names are sets hereditarily labeled by values in F .
Definition 4.4. The class of λ-names is denoted by V λ.
Formally, V λ is generated by the following transfinite inductive definition on ordinals:
V λα =






Definition 4.5. The λ-rank of a λ-name A is the smallest α such that A ∈ V λα .
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Definition 4.6. A (class-sized) weakly-dependent first-order language L arises from enriching the set of set terms of D with
constants for all λ-names.
In other words, L is just like D, but it has constants for all λ-names.
From now on until the end of this section, the letters A, B, C vary over λ-names and letter ρ varies over finite partial
functions which map first-order variables to V λ. We call such functions environments.
Definition 4.7 (Realizability Relation). For any formula φ of L, any term t of L and ρ defined on all free variables1 of φ and t ,
we define by metalevel mutual induction the realizability relationM ρ φ in an environment ρ and the meaning of a term
[[t]]ρ in an environment ρ.
• [[a]]ρ ≡ ρ(a)
• [[A]]ρ ≡ A
• [[P]]ρ is defined (inductively) in the following way:
– If P ↓ 0, then [[P]]ρ is defined to be ∅.
– If P ↓ S(Q ) and [[Q ]]ρ is defined, then [[P]]ρ is defined to be [[[[Q ]]ρ ∪ {[[Q ]]ρ}]]ρ .
Otherwise2, [[P]]ρ is defined to be ∅.
• [[tA(u⃗)]]ρ is defined in the same way as in [22].
• P ρ nat iff P ↓ 0 or P ↓ S(Q ) and Q ρ nat. Formally, P ρ nat is defined inductively in an obvious way.
• M ρ P ≡ Q iffM ↓ ax and P ≈ Q .3
• M ρ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
• M ρ t ∈I s ≡ M ↓ v ∧ (v, [[t]]ρ) ∈ [[s]]ρ
• M ρ t ∈ s andM ρ t = s are defined as usual together by mutual induction. For details, see [22].
• M ρ (p : φ) ∧ ψ ≡ M ↓< M1,M2 > ∧(M1 ρ φ) ∧ (M2 ρ ψ[p := M1])
• M ρ φ ∨ ψ ≡ (M ↓ inl(M1) ∧M1 ρ φ) ∨ (M ↓ inr(M1) ∧M1 ρ ψ)
• M ρ (p : φ)→ ψ ≡ (M ↓ λp.M1) ∧ ∀N. (N ρ φ)→ (M1[p := N] ρ ψ[p := N])
• M ρ ∃a. φ ≡ M ↓ [∗,N] ∧ ∃A ∈ V λ. N ρ φ[a := A]
• M ρ ∀a. φ ≡ M ↓ λ ∗ . N ∧ ∀A ∈ V λ. N ρ φ[a := A]
Lemma 4.8. If T →∗ T ′ then T ′ ρ φ iff T ρ φ. Similarly, if P →∗ P ′, then [[P]]ρ = [[P ′]]ρ .
Proof. Whether T ρ φ or not depends only on the value of T , which does not change with reduction or expansion. The
same claim applies to the second part of the lemma. 
Lemma 4.9. If P ρ nat, Q ρ nat and P ≈ Q , then for some v, P ↓ v and Q ↓ v.
Proof. If P ρ nat, then for some complete v, P ↓ v. Therefore also P →∗N v. Furthermore, since Q ρ nat, then for some
complete v′, Q ↓ v′, so also Q →∗N v′. By Corollary 3.9, v = v′. 
Lemma 4.10. For any A ∈ V λ, M ρ φ(A) iff M ρ φ([[A]]ρ).
Proof. Simply unwind the definition of realizability. 
The keystone of the set-theoretic part of the normalization proof is proved just as in [20].
Lemma 4.11. (M, C) ∈ [[tA(u⃗)]]ρ iff M = axRep(N) and N ρ φA(C,−−−→[[u]]ρ).
We now show the realizability properties of the erased versions ii, zz and ss, corresponding closely to their types.
Lemma 4.12. iie ρ ∀a, b. a ∈I b → a ∈ b.
Proof. Apply Theorem 7.4 in [22] to Corollary 4.2 therein. 
Lemma 4.13.
zze ρ ∅ = ∅
Proof. Recall that
zz ≡ eqRep(λ ∗ . < λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p), λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) >)
It suffices to show that λ∗ . < λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p), λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) >ρ ∀d. (d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ ∅)∧(d ∈I ∅ → d ∈ ∅).
For this purpose, for any D ∈ V λ we need to show that:
1 So in particular all free variables of φ and t must be first-order.
2 With a little bit of effort, this blatant use of excluded middle could be eliminated.
3 As defined in Definition 3.7.
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• λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzProp(p) ρ D ∈I ∅ → D ∈ ∅. This is trivially true.
• λp. ii ∗ ∗ inzRep(p) ρ D ∈I ∅ → D ∈ ∅. This is also trivially true. 
Lemma 4.14. For any A ∈ V λ, sse ρ A = A
Proof. Recall that
ss ≡ eqRep(λ ∗ . < λp. ii ∗ ∗ insProp(p), λp. ii ∗ ∗ insRep(p) >)
Let M ≡ λp. ii ∗ ∗ (λq. q) p. Then sse is equal to eqRep(λ ∗ . < M,M >). It suffices to show that λ ∗ . < M,M >ρ
∀a. a ∈I A → a ∈ A. To this end, we need to show that for any B ∈ V λ,
< M,M >ρ (B ∈I A → B ∈ A) ∧ (B ∈I A → B ∈ A)).
By Lemma 4.12, ii ∗ ∗ ρ B ∈I A → B ∈ A). So in order to show thatM ρ B ∈I A → B ∈ A, it suffices to show that for any
N ρ B ∈I A, (λq. q) N ρ B ∈I A, which follows by Lemma 4.8. The claim easily follows. 
4.2. Normalization
We now proceed to the normalization proof. In this section, environments, still denoted by ρ, are finite partial functions
such that they map:
• first-order variables to V λ,
• proof variables to realizers which are proof terms or programs.
Any such environment ρ can be used as realizability environment by considering only its restriction to first-order
variables.
Definition 4.15. WewriteM[ρ], T [ρ],Ψ [ρ] to denote the result of applying ρ as a substitution to the respective term. We
write ρ |= Γ ⊢ T : Ψ if ρ is defined on FV (Γ , T ,Ψ ) and if for all (p, φ) ∈ Γ , ρ(p) ρ φ[ρ].
Theorem 4.16 (Normalization). If Γ ⊢ T : Ψ , then for all ρ |= Γ ⊢ T : Ψ , Te[ρ] ρ Ψ [ρ].
Proof. We proceed by (metalevel) induction on Γ ⊢ T : Ψ . We show the new cases compared to [22,20]. We write T ′ in
the proof to denote Te[ρ], when ρ is clear from the context.
•
Γ ⊢ 0 : nat
Since 0′ = 0 ↓ 0, the claim follows.
•
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ S(P) : nat
By the induction hypothesis P ′ ρ nat. Since (S(P))′ = S(P ′) ↓ S(P ′), the claim follows.
•
Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : φ Γ , x : φ ⊢ R : φ
Γ ⊢ casenat(P,Q , x.R) : φ
By the induction hypothesis, P ′ ρ nat. We proceed by induction on the definition of P ′ ρ nat to show that
casenat(P ′,Q ′, x.R′) ρ φ′.
– Suppose P ′ ↓ 0. Then T ′ → Q ′ and since by the induction hypothesis Q ′ ρ φ′, the claim follows by Lemma 4.8.
– Suppose P ′ ↓ S(P1) and P1 ρ nat. By the inner induction hypothesis for P1, casenat(P1,Q ′, x.R′) ρ φ′. Let
ρ ′ be defined as ρ[x := casenat(P1,Q ′, x.R′)]. Since ρ ′ |= Γ , x : φ, by the outer induction hypothesis we get
Re[ρ ′] ρ′ φ[ρ ′]. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x was fresh, so this is equivalent to Re[x :=
casenat(P1,Q ′, x.R′)][ρ] ρ φ[ρ]. We also have casenat(P ′,Q ′, x.R′) →∗ casenat(S(P1),Q ′, x.R′) → R′[x :=
casenat(P1,Q ′, x.R′)] = Re[x := casenat(P1,Q ′, x.R′)][ρ], so the claim follows by Lemma 4.8.
•
Γ ⊢ P : nat
Γ ⊢ in(P) : P ∈I ω
By the induction hypothesis, P ′ ρ nat. We proceed by induction on the definition of P ′ ρ nat, showing additionally on
the way that [[P ′]]ρ is defined.
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– If P ′ ↓ 0, [[P ′]]ρ = ∅. Moreover, in(P ′) →∗ in(0) → omegaRep(inl(zz)). By Lemma 4.8 and the definition of
realizability, it therefore suffices to show that (omegaRep(inl(zz)),∅) ∈ [[ω]]ρ . By Lemma 4.11, it suffices to show
that inl(zz) ρ ∅ = ∅∨ (∃b. b ∈ ω∧∅ = b∪{b}). This is equivalent to zz ρ ∅ = ∅, which follows from Lemma 4.13.
– Suppose P ′ ↓ S(Q ) and Q ρ nat. Since in(P ′) →∗ in(S(Q )) → omegaRep(inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(Q ), sse >])), by
Lemma 4.8 it suffices to show that omegaRep(inr([∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(Q ), sse >])) ρ P ′ ∈I ω. By Lemma 4.11 and
the definition of realizability, it suffices to show that there is B ∈ V λ such that [∗, < ii ∗ ∗ in(Q ), sse >] ρ B ∈
ω∧[[P ′]]ρ = B∪{B}. Now, by the inner induction hypothesis, [[Q ]]ρ is defined, so [[P ′]]ρ = [[[[Q ]]ρ ∪{[[Q ]]ρ}]]ρ . Taking
B to be [[Q ]]ρ , we need to show the following.
∗ ii ∗ ∗ in(Q ) ρ [[Q ]]ρ ∈ ω. By Lemma 4.12, it suffices to show that in(Q ) ρ [[Q ]]ρ ∈I ω. Since Q ρ nat, we get
the claim by the inner induction hypothesis.
∗ sse ρ [[[[Q ]]ρ ∪ {[[Q ]]ρ}]]ρ = [[Q ]]ρ ∪ {[[Q ]]ρ}. By Lemma 4.10, it suffices to show sse ρ [[[[Q ]]ρ ∪ {[[Q ]]ρ}]]ρ =
[[[[Q ]]ρ ∪ {[[Q ]]ρ}]]ρ . Lemma 4.14 shows the claim.•
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I P Γ ⊢ _ : P ≡ Q Γ ⊢ P : nat Γ ⊢ Q : nat
Γ ⊢ eqpRep(M) : t ∈I Q
By the induction hypothesis, P ′ ≡ Q ′, P ′ ρ nat and Q ′ ρ nat. By Lemma 4.9, for some numeral n, P ′ ↓ n and Q ′ ↓ n.
By Lemma 4.8, [[P ′]]ρ = [[Q ′]]ρ = [[n]]ρ . Since (eqpRep(M))′ = (λp. p) M ′ → M ′, Lemma 4.8 applied one more time,
together with the definition of realizability for ∈I , show the claim.•
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈ ω
Γ ⊢ prog(M) : nat
By the induction hypothesis, M ′ ρ t ∈ ω. We proceed by induction on the λ-rank of [[t]]ρ , in addition showing that
prog(M) ↓ n, where n is the numeral ‘‘equal4’’ to [[t]]ρ . We haveM ′ ↓ inRep(N), N ↓ [∗,O] and there is C ∈ V λ such that
O ↓< O1,O2 >, O1 ρ C ∈I ω and O2 ρ t = C . Therefore O1 ↓ v and (v, C) ∈ [[ω]]ρ . By Lemma 4.11, v = omegaRep(P)
and P ρ C = ∅ ∨ (∃b ∈ ω. C = b ∪ {b}). We have two cases to consider:
– P ↓ inl(Q ). Then prog(M ′) ↓ 0, Q ρ C = ∅ and the claim follows.
– P ↓ inr(Q ). Then Q ρ ∃b. b ∈ ω ∧ C = b ∪ {b}. Therefore there is B ∈ V λ such that Q ↓ [∗,Q1] and
Q1 ρ B ∈ ω ∧ C = B ∪ {B}. Thus Q1 ↓< Q11,Q12 >, Q11 ρ B ∈ ω and Q12 ρ C = B ∪ {B}. Thus
prog(M ′) →∗ S(prog(Q11)). It is not difficult to see, using reasoning similar to that in Section 6.3 in [22], that the
λ-rank of B is smaller than the λ-rank of [[t]]ρ . The claim follows by the inner induction hypothesis.•
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈ ω Γ ⊢ N : u ∈ ω Γ ⊢ O : t = u
Γ ⊢ ax : prog(M) ≡ prog(N)
By the induction hypothesis,M ′ ρ t ∈ ω, N ′ ρ u ∈ ω and O′ ρ t = u. Using the proof of the previous case, it is easy
to establish that prog(M ′) and prog(N ′) normalize to the same numeral. Therefore prog(M ′) ≈ prog(N ′) and the claim
follows.
• The proofs for the rest of the rules with the conclusion Γ ⊢ ax : _ follow from properties of the ≈ relation in a
straightforward way. 
Corollary 4.17 (ZF + Con(ZF)). If ⊢ M : φ, then M ↓.
Corollary 4.18 (ZF + Con(ZF)). D is consistent: there is no term M such that ⊢ M : ⊥.
Proof. By Corollary 3.19. 
5. Mathematics
In this section, we shall see how D brings sets and programs together and allows them to interact. We will state and
prove theorems using the properties and expressive power of D. However, we prefer to think of D as one of many possible
axiomatizations of what could be termed dependent mathematics. We hope that our theorems can stand on their own and
we remain hopeful for better axiomatizations to appear in the future.
We start with some notation. If FV (T ) = {a⃗, p⃗} and the current context Γ contains p⃗ : ψ⃗ and none of p⃗ is in FV (ran(Γ )),
we will use the notation T (a⃗, p⃗ : ψ⃗) and also informally write (p, ψ) ∈ FV (T ). Note that this notation agrees with the
standard first-order logic convention, as it (informally) says that the free variables of T are among a⃗, p⃗ : ψ⃗ .
4 As far as truth in the realizability model is concerned.
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If (p, φ) ∈ FV (T ) (or a ∈ FV (T )), we write T ≡ T [p : φ] (or T ≡ T [a]), to mark all occurrences of p (or a) in T . We
read T ≡ T [p : φ] as ‘‘T is written as T [p : φ]’’. With this notation, T [M] denotes T [p := M] and T [t] denotes T [a := t],
respectively.
We restrict the possible dependencies in formulas and their intensionality. The reason is that full generality does not
seem to be useful and that it is detrimental to some of the developments. The restriction amounts to allowing only first-
order dependencies and extensional terms and formulas. Formally:
Definition 5.1. Wecall a term/formula first-order, if it does not contain any prog(M) terms.We call a formulaφ(a⃗, p⃗ : ψ⃗) flat,
if all ψ⃗ are first-order and if for any subformula (p : φ1)φ2, where ∈ {∧,→}, eitherφ1 is first-order or p /∈ FV (φ2).We
call a formula extensional, if it does not contain any ∈I relational symbols. Extensional formulas may contain computational
equivalences.
Convention 5.2. From now on, all terms and formulas we consider are flat and extensional, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Since D is a dependent framework, proof terms and proofs play an essential role in the developments. There is no
established tradition of presenting such developments in an informal mathematical discourse and our presentation is but a
try. We believe that as importance of dependent mathematics will grow, a well-established discourse will evolve. For now,
from the reader’s point of view, the most important addition to the statements of set theory is a new judgmentM : φ, read
as ‘‘M is a proof of φ’’ or ‘‘M proves φ’’, with its formal counterpart Γ ⊢ M : φ, where Γ implicitly contains all current
assumptions.
We adopt three more convenient notational conventions. We write ∀a. (p : a ∈ b) → φ as ∀p : a ∈ b. φ and similarly
∃a. (p : a ∈ b) ∧ φ as ∃p : a ∈ b. φ. Moreover, since the meaning of the dependent conjunction in the world of programs
is much closer to that of the (strong) existential quantifier, we will sometimes use the notation Σn : τ . ψ to stand for
(n : τ) ∧ ψ .
We start with the familiar properties of equality and membership.
Lemma 5.3 (Atomic Leibniz and Extensionality Axioms). ∀a, b, c. a ∈ c ∧ a = b → a ∈ b. Also, ∀a, b. a = b ↔ ∀c. c ∈ a ↔
c ∈ b.
Proof. These are shown in Lemmas 4.5. and 4.6. in [22]. 
Lemma 5.4. Equality is an equivalence relation.
Proof. This is shown in Lemmas 4.3. and 4.4. in [22]. 
Lemma 5.5 (Intensional Extensionality). If ∀c. c ∈I a ↔ c ∈I b, then a = b.
Proof. Straightforward from the (EQ) axiom and Lemma 3.3. 
Wenext prove a technical lemma of crucial importance for further developments.We call it Dependent Leibniz Principle.
It can be viewed as an extension of the standard, full first-order Leibniz axiom, which it encompasses. Just as the first-order
version states that extensionally equal sets are indistinguishable, the dependent version in addition states the same thing
about proofs of the same statements.
Lemma 5.6 (Dependent Leibniz Principle). The claim has two parts: the first-order part and the dependent part.
The first-order part is the standard first-order Leibniz axiom: for any c, if a = b, then P[c := a] ≡ P[c := b],
t[c := a] = t[c := b] and φ[c := a] ↔ φ[c := b].
The dependent part is as follows. Suppose N : Ψ and O : Ψ . If (p, φ) ∈ FV (P), then P[p := N] ≡ P[p := O]. Furthermore, if
(p,Ψ ) ∈ FV (t) then t[p := N] = t[p := O]. Finally, if (p,Ψ ) ∈ FV (φ), then φ[p := N] ↔ φ[p := O].
Proof. First let us write down the dependent part more formally. Suppose Γ ⊢ N : Ψ , Γ ⊢ O : Ψ and suppose
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ P : τ , Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t : Set and Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ φ : Form, where p /∈ FV (Γ ). Then Γ ⊢ _ : P[p := N] ≡ P[p := O],
Γ ⊢ _ : t[p := N] = t[p := O] and Γ ⊢ _ : φ[p := N] ↔ φ[p := O].
We proceed by induction on the height of the proof tree Γ ⊢ T : K in the first-order case and on the height of the proof
tree Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ T : K in the dependent case, where T ∈ {P, t, φ} and K is a simple formula, Set and Form, respectively.
Since proofs are usually identical, we carry both inductions at the same time.
We start with the representative cases for programs. Note that the first-order part of the claim is trivial, since P[c :=
a] = P = P[c := b]. For the dependent part, case the last rule applied in Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ P : τ :
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ M : s ∈ ω Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ s : Set
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ prog(M) : nat
By the induction hypothesis Γ ⊢ _ : s[p := N] = s[p := O]. By the Substitution Lemma, Γ [p := N] ⊢ M[p := N] :
s[p := N] ∈ ω and Γ [p := O] ⊢ M[p := O] : s[p := O] ∈ ω. Since p /∈ FV (Γ ), Γ ⊢ M[p := N] : s[p := N] ∈ ω
and Γ ⊢ M[p := O] : s[p := O] ∈ ω. The following proof tree shows the claim, where T , S and U are proof trees of
Γ ⊢ M[p := N] : s[p := N] ∈ ω, Γ ⊢ M[p := O] : s[p := O] ∈ ω and Γ ⊢ _ : s[p := N] = s[p := O], respectively.
T S U
Γ ⊢ ax : prog(M[p := N]) ≡ prog(M[p := O])
804 W. Moczydłowski / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 789–808
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ Q : nat Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ R : τ Γ , p : Ψ , x : τ ⊢ S : τ
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ casenat(Q , R, x.S) : τ
Applying the induction hypothesis we get Γ , x : τ ⊢ S[p := N] ≡ S[p := O]. Therefore we also get Γ ⊢ casenat(Q [p :=
N], R[p := N], x.S[p := N]) ≡ casenat(Q [p := N], R[p := N], x.S[p := O]). Two more applications of the induction
hypothesis and transitivity of≡ show the claim.
We further proceed with the representative cases for the set terms. Case the last rule applied in Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t : Set:
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ P : nat
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ P : Set
The first-order part is trivial. For the dependent part, we need to show that P[p := N] = P[p := O]. By the induction
hypothesis, P[p := N] ≡ P[p := O]. Applying the proof rule:
Γ ⊢ M : t ∈I P[p := N] Γ ⊢ _ : P[p := N] ≡ Q [p := N]
Γ ⊢ eqpRep(M) : t ∈I P[p := O]
we get ∀e. e ∈I P[p := N] ↔ e ∈I P[p := O]. By Lemma 5.5, P[p := N] = P[p := O].
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t1 : Set Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t2 : Set
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ {t1, t2} : Set
For the first-order part, suppose a = b. By the induction hypothesis, t1[c := a] = t1[c := b] and t2[c := a] = t2[c := b].
So if t ∈I t[c := a], then t ∈ t[c := b], so also t ∈I t[c := b] and similarly t ∈I t[c := b] → t ∈I t[c := a]. Therefore
d ∈I t[c := a] ↔ d ∈I t[c := b]. By Lemma 5.5, t[c := a] = t[c := b].
Now, also by the induction hypothesis, t1[p := N] = t1[p := O] and t2[p := N] = t2[p := O]. By exactly the same
argument, t[p := N] = t[p := O].
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t1 : Set
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t1 : Set
Suppose a = b. By the induction hypothesis, t1[c := a] = t1[c := b]. It therefore suffices to show that if e = f , then
e =  f . So suppose d ∈I  e. Then d ∈ d1 ∈ e for some e. By Extensionality, d1 ∈ f , so also d ∈I  f . Lemma 5.5
shows the claim. For the dependent part, the proof is exactly the same.
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ (q : e ∈ t1) ∧ φ1[f⃗ := t⃗] : Form Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t1 : Set Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t⃗ : Set
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ Sq,e,f⃗ . φ1(t1, t⃗) : Set
Suppose d ∈I t[c := a]. Then (p : d ∈ t1[c := a]) ∧ φ1[f⃗ := t⃗][c := a][e := d]. Therefore also (p :
d ∈ t1[c := a]) ∧ φ1[f⃗ := t⃗][e := d][c := a]. By the induction hypothesis for (p : e ∈ t1) ∧ φ1[f⃗ := t⃗],
(p : d ∈ t1[c := b]) ∧ φ1[f⃗ := t⃗][e := d][c := b], hence d ∈I t[c := b]. Similarly, d ∈I t[c := b] → d ∈I t[c := a], so
Lemma 5.5 shows the claim. For the dependent part, the proof is exactly the same.
Finally, we show the interesting cases for formulas. Case the last rule applied in Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ φ : Form:
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t : Set Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ s : Set
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ t ∈ s : Form
By the induction hypothesis, t[p := N] = t[p := O] and s[p := N] = s[p := O]. Lemma 5.3 shows the claim. Similar
reasoning applies to the first-order part of the claim.
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ φ1 : Form Γ , p : Ψ , q : φ1 ⊢ φ2 : Form
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ (q : φ1)→ φ2 : Form
Since φ is flat, we have two cases to consider:
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– φ1 is first-order. Then p /∈ FV (φ1). By the induction hypothesis Γ , q : φ1 ⊢ _ : φ2[p := N] ↔ φ2[p := O]. Therefore
we can easily derive Γ , _ : φ1 → φ2[p := N], q : φ1 ⊢ _ : φ2[p := O], from which the claim follows.
– q /∈ φ2. Suppose φ1[p := N] → φ2[p := N] and φ1[p := O]. By the induction hypothesis, φ1[p := N], so φ2[p := N].
By the induction hypothesis again, φ2[p := O].
In both cases, the first-order part proceeds in the same fashion.
•
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ φ1 : Form Γ , p : Ψ , q : φ1 ⊢ φ2 : Form
Γ , p : Ψ ⊢ (q : φ1) ∧ φ2 : Form
Since φ is flat, we have two cases to consider:
– φ1 is first-order. Then Γ , q : φ1 ⊢ _ : φ2[p := N] ↔ φ2[p := O]. Let Γ ′ = Γ , r : (q : φ1) ∧ φ2[p := N]. By
Weakening, Γ ′, q : φ1 ⊢ _ : φ2[p := N] ↔ φ2[p := O], so by the Substitution Lemma Γ ′ ⊢ _ : φ2[p := N][q :=
fst(r)] ↔ φ2[p := O][q := fst(r)]. Since Γ ′ ⊢ fst(r) : φ1 and Γ ′ ⊢ snd(r) : φ2[p := N][q := fst(r)], the claim easily
follows.
– q /∈ FV (φ2). Then φ is a simple conjunction and the claim follows by two applications of the induction hypothesis.
The first-order part proceeds in the same fashion in both cases. 
Corollary 5.7. For any term tA(a), c ∈ tA(A)↔ φA(c, a⃗).
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 4.9 in [22]. 
We will use the notation {p : a ∈ t | φ} for the set S such that a ∈ S ↔ p : a ∈ t ∧ φ, existing due to the Separation
axiom.
From now on, we work in D. In other words, all lemmas and theorems apart from these labeled as schemas, have their
formal counterparts in D.
Definition 5.8. P0 is the canonical proof of 0 ∈ ω. PS(n, q) is the canonical proof of S(n) ∈ ω, given q : n ∈ ω. Formally:
P0 ≡ ii ∗ ∗ omegaRep(inl(eqRefl ∗))
PS(n, q) ≡ ii ∗ ∗ omegaRep(inr([∗, < q, eqRefl ∗ >])
Now we can derive our first truly new set-theoretical theorem: a dependent induction principle. Roughly speaking, just
as it is sufficient in standard proofs by mathematical induction to consider only the cases for zero and successor, in the
dependent case it suffices to consider only the canonical proofs of membership of respective sets in ω.
Theorem 5.9 (Dependent Induction Schema). For any φ such that (p, n ∈ ω) ∈ FV (φ), let φ ≡ φ[p, n]. If φ[P0, 0] and
∀q : n ∈ ω. φ[q, n] → φ[PS(n, q), n ∪ {n}], then ∀p : n ∈ ω. φ[p, n].
Proof. Consider the set A ≡ {p : n ∈ ω | φ[p, n]}.
First, by φ[P0, 0], 0 ∈ A. Second, take any n ∈ A. Then there is p : n ∈ ω such that φ[p, n]. Therefore φ[PS(n, p), n ∪ {n}].
Since PS(n, p) : n∪{n} ∈ ω, n∪{n} ∈ A. Thus A contains 0 and is closed under successor, so asω is the smallest set containing
0 and closed under successor, ω ⊆ A.
So take any p : n ∈ ω. Since ω ⊆ A, n ∈ A, so there is r such that r : (q : n ∈ ω) ∧ φ[q, n]. Therefore fst(r) : n ∈ ω and
snd(r) : φ[fst(r), n]. By Dependent Leibniz Principle, φ[fst(r), n] ↔ φ[p, n]. Therefore we also have φ[p, n], which shows
the claim. 
Lemma 5.10 (Program Schema). For all programs P,Q , if P ≡ Q , then P = Q .
Proof. Suppose P ≡ Q and take any A ∈I P . Then A ∈I Q , so A ∈ Q . On the other hand, suppose A ∈I Q . Since ≡ is
symmetric, the claim easily follows. 
Lemma 5.11 (Program Schema). For any q : n ∈ ω, prog(PS(n, q))→∗ S(prog(q)).
Proof. The following chain of reductions shows the claim.
prog(PS(n, q)) = prog(ii ∗ ∗ omegaRep(inr([∗, < q, eqRefl ∗ >]))
→∗ prog(inRep([∗, < omegaRep(inr([∗, < q, eqRefl ∗ >]), eqRefl ∗)
→ S(prog(q)) 
Lemma 5.12. For all p : n ∈ ω, prog(p) = n.
Proof. We proceed by dependent induction.
• Case P0 : ∅ ∈ ω. We need to show prog(P0) = ∅. Since prog(P0)→ 0, prog(P0) ≡ 0. By Lemma 5.10, prog(P0) = 0. Since
zz : 0 = ∅, the claim follows.
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• Given p : n ∈ ω such that prog(p) = n, we need to show prog(PS(p)) = n ∪ {n}. By Lemma 5.11, prog(PS(p)) →∗
S(prog(p)), so prog(PS(p)) ≡ S(prog(p)). By Lemma 5.10, prog(PS(p)) = S(prog(p)). We also have S(prog(p)) =
prog(p) ∪ {prog(p)}. Since prog(p) = n, prog(p) ∪ {prog(p)} = n ∪ {n}, thus the claim follows. 
Since D normalizes and has the Subject Reduction and Progress properties, it is easy [21] to derive the disjunction,
numerical existence and term existence properties for D. However, D also offers a much better choice — we can state and
prove the Numerical Existence Property inside D:
Lemma 5.13. ∀a ∈ ω. (φ(a)→ Σn : nat. φ(n)).
Proof. Take any p : a ∈ ω such that φ(a). Set n = prog(p). We need to show φ(prog(p)). By Lemma 5.12, prog(p) = a, so
since we have φ(a), the claim follows by the Leibniz principle. 
Corollary 5.14 (Numerical Existence Property).
(∃a ∈ ω. φ(a))→ Σn : nat. φ(n)
Definition 5.15. ForM : ∃a ∈ ω. φ(a)we define nep(M) to be the term we obtain from Corollary 5.14:
nep(M) : Σn : nat. φ(n)
Note that Corollary 5.14 states exactly what the Numerical Existence Property usually says on a metalevel: if T ⊢ ∃a ∈
ω. φ(a), then there is a numeral n such that T ⊢ φ(n). Thanks to normalization and the properties of D, we know that
fst(nep(M)) is such a numeral.
It would not be difficult to extend the system with booleans and internalize the disjunction property in a similar way.
The term existence property, however, due to contradictions lurking around the corner [20], does not seem to be easily
internalizable.
The Numerical Existence Property is just the beginning. We can also state and prove program extraction meaningfully:
Theorem 5.16 (Program Extraction).
(∀x ∈ ω∃y ∈ ω. φ(x, y))→ Σ f : nat→ nat. ∀q : x ∈ ω. φ(x, f prog(q))
Proof. Suppose p : ∀x ∈ ω∃y ∈ ω. φ(x, y). Define f as follows. f takes n : nat and returns fst(nep(p ∗ (ii ∗ ∗ in(n)))). To
show correctness, take any q : x ∈ ω. We know there is y ∈ ω such that φ(x, y). By the definition of f and properties of nep,
f prog(q) is them : nat such that φ(prog(q),m). Since prog(q) = x, we also have φ(x,m), so the claim follows. 
The following version of the Axiom of Choice shows that the computation influences significantly the set-theoretic part
of D. An interesting question, which we leave open, is whether stronger forms of AC, such as Dependent Choice, could be
proved as well.
Theorem 5.17 (ACω,ω).
∀x ∈ ω∃y ∈ ω. φ(x, y)→ ∃f ∈ ω→ ω. ∀x ∈ ω. φ(x, f (x))
Proof. Suppose p : ∀x ∈ ω∃y ∈ ω. φ. Define:
n(q) ≡ fst(nep(p ∗ (ii ∗ ∗ in(prog(q)))))
f ≡ {z | ∃q : x′ ∈ ω. z = (x′, n(q))}
We first show that f is a function. Take any q : x ∈ ω. Let y = n(q). It is easy to see that n(q) : nat, so y ∈ ω. And obviously
(x, y) ∈ f .
Now, take any y′ such that (x, y′) ∈ f . We need to show that y′ = y. Since (x, y′) ∈ f , we know that there is q′ : x′ ∈ ω
such that (x, y′) = (x′, n(q′)). Therefore, x = x′ and y′ = n(q′). Since q : x ∈ ω, q′ : x′ ∈ ω and x = x′, prog(q) ≡ prog(q′),
therefore n(q) ≡ n(q′) and n(q) = n(q′), so y = y′.
Finally, take any q : x ∈ ω. We need to show that φ(x, f (x)). In other words, that φ(x, n(q)). But by the definition of n(q),
n(q) is them : nat such that φ(x,m), hence the claim follows. 
Corollary 5.18. In D, Dedekind real numbers and Cauchy real numbers are the same. Furthermore, D is stronger than IZFR, as the
first part of the claim does not hold in IZFR.
Proof. The first part of the claim follows by Proposition 3.21 in [3]. We learned the second part of the claim by personal
communication with Lubarsky; it follows easily from the first part of the claim and results of [16]. We were also informed
that it easily follows from results of [10] as well. 
We conclude with the program and the claim we started with.
Lemma 5.19. Let f = λx. casenat(x, 0, y.S(y)). Then ∀p : n ∈ ω. f (prog(p)) ≡ prog(p).
Proof. We proceed by dependent induction on p : n ∈ ω. For P0 : 0 ∈ ω, we have f (prog(P0)) →∗ 0 and also
prog(P0)→∗ 0, so the claim follows. Suppose we have the claim for q : n ∈ ω. We need to show it for PS(n, q) : S(n) ∈ ω. By
Lemma 5.11, prog(PS(n, q))→∗ S(prog(q)), so f prog(PS(n, q))→∗ S(prog(q)). The claim follows by reflexivity of≡. 
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6. Conclusion
We have presented a new foundational framework, unifying sets and programs and showed how the combination
enriches both worlds. We believe this work is but a first step into the realm of dependent set theory. The fact that it is
possible now to clearly delineate ‘‘concrete’’ computational objects from their set-theoretic counterparts, yet allow them
to interact in a unified setting, raises numerous interesting questions. For example, how exactly does tinkering with the
programming language and its type system influence set theory? How far inside the realm of sets can we go to discover the
computational content hiding in the proofs?
A more concrete question concerns the formulation of D. We first proved the normalization theorem for D and later
restricted the system for the purpose of dependentmathematics.While this approach allowed us to prove the normalization
theorem for a much stronger system, it would likely be an obstacle to implementing D. Is there a nicer formulation of the
restricted part of D?
We are hopeful to see answers to these questions.
6.1. Related work
Dependent type theories, dating back to deBruijn’s Automath, implemented inmany systems [29,8,25], are a foundational
setting which also integrates logic with programs. Nuprl [8], in particular, is close to our D, since its programming language
is defined before the logic and can be extended freely. Dependent types have also been used as building blocks to define
logics [13]. An interesting question is whether one could construct an extension of D along the same lines, providing it with
full reflection capabilities.
Moczydłowski [20] presents a dependent set theory IZFD, resulting by extending IZFR with dependent implications,
conjunctions and restricted Σ-types. IZFD does not have nice proof-theoretic properties, such as Subject Reduction, and
it does not support the post-construction-verification paradigm. It also does not have the Numerical Existence Property, not
to mention capability to internalize it.
Howe [14] combines a programming language with set theory to provide a model for extensions of Nuprl. He does not
provide a formal system to axiomatize his model. Map theory [12] integrates programs and sets in a setting stronger than
ZFC. Since it does not have a nice axiomatization from the proof-theoretical point of view, it does not support the correct-
by-construction paradigm.
Constructive set theories have also been interpreted in computational frameworks such as type theory [2] and deduction
modulo [9]. [26,28] investigate linear set theories. These investigations share the foundational character of our work. Their
goals and results are different from ours, however.
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